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TWO LETTERS,

DESCRIBING

A METHOD

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Increasing the Quantity

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CIRCULATING-MONEY:

Upon a new and folid Principle.

LONDON: 1799.

Printed by A. Strahan, Printers Street, Gough Square.



A METHOD

OF

Increasing the Quantity

OF

CIRCULATING-MONEY:

Upon a new and folid Principle.

LETTER I.



CONTENTS.

1+ -. 5Rt

	SECT. I Assumes the Necessity of an	Ex-	
	tension of the Circulating Medium.	Page	e 7
	SECT. II Basis of a Plan for fuch an	n Ex-	
	tension	-	9
	SECT. III The Plan stated	-	ib.
	SECT. IV Confequences of the Plan to S	Stock-	
	Proprietors	-	13
	SECT. VNo Danger to them.	-	15
	SECT. VIThey might gain too much by	it.	ib.
	SECT. VII.—Government must partake		
	them in the Profits	-	18
cor	SECT. VIII So must the Bank of England	nd.	19
U	SECT. IX Question suggested.	ike .	20
42.	SECT. XThe Plan may be improved.		21
20-1	SECT. XI.—General Obfervations.		
1		-	22
1	SECT. XII.—Originality of the Plan.	-	23
lin			
have	A 2 ,		
1			



INTRODUCTION.

THE PRINCIPLE of this Proposal is to put a NEW and GREAT CAPITAL into CIRCU-LATION, by LOANS OF MONEY, to be created in the manner and upon the foundation described in the following LETTER, addressed to a Member of the late SECRET COMMITTEE of the HOUSE of COMMONS on BANK AFFAIRS.

The gentleman, to whom the Letter was addreffed, (whofe name, if I thought myfelf at liberty to mention it, would add much authority to the whole propofal,) being himfelf ftruck with the novelty of the meafure, and its apparent tendency to public utility, has been the means of procuring a confiderable degree of favour to it ELSEWHERE. —But, if I were to fay more of this, it could only be with a view to obtain attention,—not to influence the *public judgment*, which alone can decide in this cafe, as in all others where PUBLIC CREDIT is concerned.—Therefore, I fhall only fay, I have good reafon to think that the *firft impreffions*, *impressions*, made in the quarter to which I allude, are ftill RETAINED.

IT is my intention to point out in a future Letter, for which I have prepared materials, how I propose to confine the increase of money, in its first application, to the affistance of the LANDED INTEREST; and I shall, at the fame time, answer fuch OBJECTIONS as I may hear of, or which my own thoughts may fuggeft to me; for, I shall difguife nothing .- In the mean time, I admit that it is neceffary to the PRACTICAL EXECUTION of the plan, that the notes in queffion should be Ex-CHANGEABLE for ALL commodities, - by no means excepting GOLD; and exchangeable AT PAR: otherwife they cannot perform the office of MONEY .---I beg permiffion to add, that I think this may be ACCOMPLISHED. And I fhall fhew how the SE-CURITY may be DOUBLED, both in its nature and amount, without leffening the fimplicity of the original defign; and this to the extent of proving it to be ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE that the Note-Creditors should be defrauded, or even disappointed, SO LONG as any notion of LAW and PROPERTY shall continue practically to prevail in GREAT BRITAIN.

LONDON, 23d April 1799.

METHOD,

A

Br. Br. Br.

SECT. I.—Assumes the Necessity of an Extension of the Circulating Medium.

SIR,

OF late, we have heard but little of the plans for a NEW CIRCULATING MEDIUM, with which the public attention was much engaged about the time of the BANK's ceafing to make payments in cafh. No plan of that kind feems yet to have obtained general approbation; and, perhaps, that which I am about to fubmit to your confideration may not be free from objection.

I HAVE entered thus upon the fubject without ceremony; becaufe, Sir, the indulgence you have fhewn me in the feveral conferences you have honoured me with on the occafion, has fuperfeded the neceffity of any introductory matter, unlefs I had had attempted to express the feeling I have of your obliging attention in this instance, which I decline, as a task not easy in itself, and still less so, in connection with other acts of condescension which I cannot fail to recollect, though I am not able to acknowledge them in the manner I should wish to do.

IN common with all those who have preceded me in this track, I begin with affuming that there would be found great convenience in the eftablishment of a good, folid, circulating medium, upon a more enlarged fcale than any that exists at prefent, and adapted to the extended and extending state of our NATIONAL COMMERCE, and particularly to the wants of the LANDED INTEREST. If this was denied, or generally doubted, I should have little to fay at prefent; for, if the necessfity or utility of such an establishment is not felf-evident, I should think the time for it is not yet come.

My experience in bulinefs, however, informs me that it is wanted.—Permanent loans of money are now, and for a long time have been, difficult to be obtained; and this difficulty muft, from obvious caufes, continue to increase fo long as the war lafts.

(9)

SECT. II. - Basis of a Plan for such an Extension.

HAVING premifed this, I proceed to flate my plan for the eftablishment of a New Circulating Medium.

THE basis of it, as I have remarked in what you have heard from me already, I fix upon the NA-TIONAL DEBT, which is the WEALTH of INDIVI-DUALS.—For commercial purposes at least, I conceive this may be deemed folid substantial property —to a limited extent.

SUPPOSE the National Debt due to individuals to be equal to FOUR HUNDRED MILLIONS (or more) of 3 per Cent. Annuities of the value of 50 per cent.; that is, Two HUNDRED MILLIONS fterling. This fuppofition is fufficiently accurate for my prefent purpofe.

SECT. III. The Plan Stated.

Now, my fcheme goes to the putting of a large portion, FIFTY MILLIONS, or more, of this property into circulation, if fo much could be em-B ployed; (10)

ployed ; and this I propose to be done in the following manner:

LET any flock-holder, who would wifh to circulate fome part of his STOCK, without felling it, transfer a certain quantity of it, fuppofe twenty thousand pounds 3 per Cents. to the GOVERNORS and DIRECTORS of the BANK. The Bank is then to deliver to him fifty certificates, or notes of the transfer, each of them to be marked as of the value of \pounds .100, or a greater quantity in number, and of lefs value respectively; but the whole together to be of the amount of \pounds .5000 fterling.

By this means every particular quantity of flock might produce a fourth part of its nominal amount for the purpofes of circulation. For, I make what I believe to be a well-grounded fuppofition, that the mercantile world, who now take BANK-NOTES in payment, would, with equal confidence, receive and circulate thefe STOCK-NOTES; the Governors and Directors of the Bank of England being, in refpect to the flock to be transferred to them, truftees for thofe who transfer the flock, and for thofe who take the flock-notes in payment, (as they now are truftees for the Bank-Proprietors and the holders of Bank-notes,) and the fecurity being fully equal to that

that upon which the credit of Bank-notes is founded :--- for, the capital and other effects of the Bank (reckoning its property in flock at the prefent market-rate) is certainly fhort of twice the amount of its debts. But the ftock, transferred as I propofe, would be double in value to the notes circulated upon its credit.

In the cafe I have fuggested, the 3 per Cents. would be taken at 25; a fuppofition low enough, I should suppose, for those who give any degree of credit whatever to the PUBLIC FUNDS. There can be no doubt that bankers and others would allow £.100 flock to be a sufficient security for £.25 money, notwithstanding all the possible fluctuations to which the flocks are subject.

THE notes I have described might be used for loans or for capitals to trade upon; their ufe in trade, and for other purposes, being supposed the fame as specie or Bank-notes.

THESE notes being, by fuppolition, of the fame value, and paffing with the fame facility as Banknotes do, will be confidered as CASH, and confequently, if lent by the original holders, or by any others who may become the holders of them, would entitle the lender to receive INTEREST ON the

the loan, in like manner as the lender of banknotes now receives interest on the loan of those notes.

THE fuppolition that these notes would be circulated like bank-notes is effential to my plan.— That foundation taken away, the whole would be an unfubftantial vision; and therefore, if this be not affented to, it would be of no use for me to go on. But, that point granted, (subject to re-confideration,) I fay that every particular quantity of flock, transferred in the manner I have flated, would yield a profit to the flock-transferrer equal to 5 per cent. on the amount of flock-notes obtained by him.

TWENTY THOUSAND POUNDS, 3 per Cent. flock, would, as observed before, produce £.5000 of flock-notes, the interest of which would be £.250, to be added to £.600, the amount of the dividends on £.20,000 of that flock. Thus £.850 would be gained annually, instead of £.600, by every proprietor of £.20,000 flock, who should avail himself of the opportunity of procuring flock-notes, as above mentioned.

WHAT I have faid of 3 per Cent. ftock, is to be applied to the other public funds in the like proportion;

(13)

proportion; the 3 per Cents. being mentioned only by way of example.

SECT. IV.—Confequences of the Plan to Stock-Proprietors.

I SHALL purfue the fuppolition thus made, and fhall trace its confequences to the ftock-proprietor, treating the matter at prefent as if no other intereft than his was to be confulted; difregarding, therefore, at this moment, the interefts of GOVERN-MENT and the BANK OF ENGLAND, both of which I fhall feparately confider in what I have farther to fay. In this point of view, I fuppofe the whole dividends on the ftock are to continue payable to the ftock-transferers; a fuppolition to be corrected in the farther progrefs of this difcuffion.

£. 850 being gained annually inftead of £. 600, the value of flock may be expected to rife in proportion to the increase of gain.

IN the fubsequent details on this point, I fhall fuppose the stock-proprietor would transfer his stock to the trustees, upon my plan, for the fake of much less advantage than what I have above described; for, out of the great profit above alluded to, it is necessfary to provide inducements

(14)

to Government and to the Bank of England to countenance the plan.

AT prefent I shall proceed to attend farther to the interests of the stock-proprietor.

WHAT objection can be make? Can he fay his flock is tied up and put out of his power? No: —he may redeem it by bringing in to the Bank a quantity of flock-notes equal in amount to those originally obtained by him. These being cancelled, his flock would be again entirely free: or he may fell the flock subject to the charge upon it: this would make it *light* to hold; which, by rendering the flock more marketable, would increase its value.

MERCHANTS, bankers, country-gentlemen, farmers, and in general flock-holders of all defcriptions, would be benefited by the plan, and particularly the *timid* would derive encouragement to *bold on* their *flock*. For if they withdraw half the amount of the prefent price of flock, they may realize that part on land, by procuring purchafes or mortgages. This would alfo accommodate thofe who want to fell land, or borrow money on it, or to borrow on other fecurity. THE transferrer would retain to himfelf the advantage of future increase of price, just as if he had not taken the stock-notes.

SECT. V .- No Danger to them.

BUT is there no final danger of loss to the flockproprietor upon this plan ? None, I think. For fuppofe the holders of the ftock-notes fhould become alarmed for their fecurity by the falling of ftock to 25; and fuppose the plan should provide, that then the flock should, at that price, become the property of the holders of the flock-notes, and be transferred to them in proportion to the amount of the notes held by them respectively, unless redeemed immediately by the proprietors of the ftock; it may be made clear, that he that was the original flock-holder cannot be hurt by having received the notes, even though he should not redeem the flock. For if he has retained the right of redemption, and confequently the rifk, it is by his own voluntary act that he has done fo. He might have fold out ; but, having retained the ftock, he cannot fuffer more by parting with his flock now, than if he had held it on, and was now to fell it, without having received any flock-notes. He may even have an advantage by buying an equal quantity

(16)

quantity of the flock at the reduced price, fuppofing it below 25, or prevent a lofs if the price is 25, or upwards; and, upon both fuppofitions, five thousand pounds, or thereabouts, would replace his twenty thousand pounds flock.

FOUR things must concur in order to occasion any actual loss to the transferrer of flock upon this plan. First; the stock must fall below 25. Secondly; the transferrer must be unable to redeem it at that reduced rate. Thirdly; the stock must afterwards rise to a higher price. Fourthly'; if there be (as of course there must be) an interval of time between the fall and the rise, the transferrer must continue, during the whole interval, unable to purchase a quantity of stock equal to what he had when he obtained the notes.

THE occurrence and operation of these numerous causes is a most improbable supposition; especially confidering that the transferrer must be understood to have received an equivalent in property of some kind on parting with his notes, and, therefore, may be expected to be able to redeem his stock, or to buy an equal quantity at the supposed price of 25.

But perhaps the stock-notes may have been applied to purchase land or land-tax.—Well, at least leaft the transferrer has then realized half the amount of his flock at the prefent price, befides the annual increase of \pounds . 250 upon his \pounds . 20,000: and he must confider that, if he had continued to hold his flock till the supposed period of ultimate depreciation, his loss would be greater than it can be upon any supposition affecting this plan; which includes the annual gain of \pounds . 250 upon the \pounds . 20,000 flock.

SECT. VI .- They might gain too much by it.

IF, according to the fupposition above made, fifty millions could thus be brought into circulation, the gain to the flock-holders would be \pounds . 2,500,000 flerling annually, and fo in proportion, if the circulating medium should be used in lefs or greater extent.

But two millions five hundred thousand pounds would be too great a gain for the flock-holder, who could not reasonably expect to have so much, especially if the scheme be attended with only part of the other advantages (including that of fastety) which I have stated.

(18)

SECT. VII.—Government must partake with them in the Profits.

THEREFORE I come now to confider the interests of GOVERNMENT and the BANK OF ENGLAND.

IT may be thought proper that fo much of the dividends as is equal to 5 per cent. on the flocknotes should be kept back by Government: that is, that the payment of fo much of the dividends should be fuspended during the war, and that the amount of these dividends should at the end of the war be divided between the flock-holders, the Government, and the Bank of England, in fuch proportions as may be agreed upon. In fpeaking of the flock-holder in this place, I mean the perfon who should actually possess the stock at that period; and his share of the accumulated dividends should then be added to his capital, and the future interest of it provided for by taxes, unless Government should then be able to pay the arrears of dividends; I mean the flock-holder's share of those dividends. In case a suspension of dividends fhould be thought improper, fome other arrangement might be adopted, as the mutual interests of Government and the stock-proprietors might dictate.

IF Government could, by this means, fufpend during the war the payment of dividends to the amount of two millions five hundred thoufand pounds, or even half of that fum, fuch a postponement, or any equivalent advantage to Government, would be attended with important confequences.

FUTURE LOANS might be negociated on better terms, the price of flocks being fuppofed to rife as well in confequence of the advantages given to the flock-transferrers, as of the taking of a great quantity of flock out of the market. The RE-DEMPTION of the LAND-TAX would be facilitated, and the neceffity to fell flock would be very much diminifhed, at the fame time that there would be a great increase of inducements to buy and hold flock.

SECT. VIII .- So must the Bank of England.

IN regard to the BANK of ENGLAND, the advantages to be allotted to that company would be fuch as might be agreed upon between them and the ftock-transferrers, by way of an annual increase of the BANK PROFITS; and also as a compensation for the charges of management. But there is no occasion at prefent to enter into details upon this part of the fubject.

SECT. IX .- Question Suggested.

AFTER ALL, however, there remains the queftion before fuggefted: " Could thefe STOCK-NOTES be " ufed as a Circulating Medium; or, in other words, " would they pafs as MONEY?"

THIS I cannot determine; but I fee many confiderations which may be fuppofed to operate towards caufing the free and general currency of thefe notes.

THE fecurity upon which the notes are to circulate, would be a FIRST MORTGAGE on the PRO-PERTY and INDUSTRY of the NATION. The fcheme would raife the value of the funds, and would advance our AGRICULTURE, as well as extend our TRADE, both foreign and domeftic, by bringing into action a new and great CAPITAL: and all this would tend to improve the STRENGTH of the NATION. Hence greater SAFETY to every part of our property.

THESE appear to me to be fufficiently powerful inducements to the public to receive and circulate as Cafb the proposed stock-notes. BUT if, in fact, the fecurity for the National Debt is not to be effected good for a fourth part of its nominal amount, then, I fear, our cafe is hopelefs indeed. This, however, appears to me to be a groundlefs apprehension.

A τ all events, the caution of the moft fearful muft have fome limits; and if, through the prevalence of diftruft, the notes defcribed could not be circulated at 25, they might undoubtedly at fome lower rate. Therefore, the objection founded on fuppofed infecurity, does not reach the principle of the measure, and can only at the utmost confine its operation.

SECT. X .- The Plan may be improved.

THIS fcheme, if it has any thing of value in it, may undoubtedly be *improved*; and, perhaps, the indirect and collateral refults from it may be as confiderable as its direct and immediate effects.

I AM not, however, fo fond of my plan as to make an unqualified fuppofition that it is capable of producing fuch great advantages as I have defcribed. Yet I do not mean to conceal that I have a ftrong confidence in it; and I own, if I were to indulge indulge my prefent thoughts, I should say much more of the advantages I expect from it.

SECT. XI .- General Observations.

BUT I shall now only make a few GENERAL OB-SERVATIONS, which shall conclude this Letter, and the trouble which, SIR, you have allowed me to give you.

First, IN A COMMERCIAL COUNTRY THERE SHOULD BE AS LITTLE DEAD OR UNPRODUCTIVE CAPITAL AS POSSIBLE: but the wealth of individuals collected in the funds is *dead to trade and general use*, except only fo far as the dividends are spent and circulated, and not invested in the fame funds by way of farther accumulation.

And, fecondly, THERE OUGHT TO BE NO SUCH THING KNOWN AS WANT OF MONEY ;—and, in my opinion, no fuch want could be known in a perfectly well-regulated commercial flate: I mean no want of that kind fhould be known or felt by thofe who poffers property of any kind, whether it confifts of lands, merchandize, or credits well fecured. All fuch property fhould enable the owner to procure a REPRESENTATIVE SIGN capable of general circulation. I fay this, fubject to many obvious RESTRICTIONS.

SECT.

(23)

SECT. XII.-Originality of the Plan.

IT was, by thinking for a long time upon these two principles, and by turning over in my mind feveral plans for procuring money for fome perfons of property, who found it difficult to obtain Loans, that I was led to the prefent DISCOVERY, if it is one, as I believe it to be. To me, at least it is *new*, and fo it has appeared to those friends to whom I have communicated it: but if any one shall dispute the absolute originality of the thought, I shall not be much concerned about that, because it is quite certain that in its operation it will be new, and, what is infinitely more material, the advantages of it will be confined, almost exclusively, to our own COUNTRY, where alone such a great capital as I have proposed to put in circulation is to be found.

I have the honor to be,

SIR, &c. &c. &c.

LONDON, Sept. 27, 1798.

"The the

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A METHOD

OF

Increasing the Quantity

OF

CIRCULATING-MONEY:

Upon a new and folid Principle.

LETTER II.



ADVERTISEMENT.

THE measure suggested in the First Letter on this fubject having been approved of by a very great number of those who are best qualified to judge of it,-including perfons of ALL ranks and parties, without diffinction ;---I confider it as a tribute of respect due to those who have given their fanction to the general idea of the plan, to fubmit to them the following detail of its propofed practical application, together with answers to some objections :- my defign, in respect to the distribution of this Letter, being to limit it, for the prefent, to those perfons whose opinions and fuggeftions upon it, as a fketch ftill admitting of IMPROVEMENT, I am defirous of obtaining.

24th JUNE 1799.

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CONTENTS

OF THE

SECOND LETTER.

SECT. IPROOF of the Necessity of an	Exten-	
fion of the Circulating Medium; whi	ich had	
been before assumed.	Page	7
SECT. II.—Danger of the Landed Intere	:st.	II
SECT. III.—Correction of a wrong Sup	position	
made by fome Perfons.	-	13
SECT. IV Prices of Commodities not i	nconve-	
niently raised by Paper Money.	~	14
SECT. V The Advantages of the Plan,	how to	
be disposed of	-	17
SECT. VI How the Plan may be app	lied to	
the Relief of the Landed Interest.	-	18
SECT. VII.—General Advantages.		22

A 3

SECT.

(6)

SECT. VIII. of Interes					
Debt.	-	-	-	Page	23
SECT. IX	-Bank of	England	d.—How	this Plan	
may be co			-	-	29
Sect. X	The Secu	rity and	l Convenie	nce to the	
Public un	der this	Plan.		~	32
Sect. XI	-Conclusio	07% .		-	35
Postscrivt				*	37

METHOD,

A

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SECT. I.— Proof of the Necessity of an Extension of the Circulating Medium; which had been before assumed.

SIR,

IN my former letter upon the fubject of my propofal of a method of increasing the quantity of circulating money, I affumed the neceffity of the measure to be felf-evident to those who give attention to the whole circumstances of the case: but, as I find there are some who deny the want of an increase of circulating money, I should wish to remind those perfons, that they have overlooked several important considerations. It is evident they pay no degree of attention to the impracticability of borrowing money on LANDED SECURITY, in consequence as well

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of the high rate of interest obtainable from Government fecurities, and the expectation of future gain by the rife of stocks, as of the great profits which trade affords; by the operation of which causes, the whole circulating capital of the nation is drawn away from land to those more profitable objects; except what is taken up on ANNUITIES,—the most pernicious mode of raising money, but at this time the only expedient by which land-owners can borrow.

THE perfons who maintain that there is at prefent no want of money also overlook the possibility (or rather the certainty) that at some period, not very distant, TRADE itself will again feel that distress from the obstructed circulation of money, which occasioned such extremely ferious alarm in 1793 and 1796, and the early part of 1797.

I SAY this without fuppoling a want of general profperity in the country: the diftrefs I allude to may even be caufed by the increase of the commerce of the nation, which possibly may yet be doubled; but certainly not without wanting a double capital in money.

THE late fudden and great increase of taxes will also require an addition to be made to the circulating medium.— The GOLD withdrawn from circulation must also be supplied by PAPER.

THE unufual facility with which money, or Bankpaper, which is money whilft it circulates as fuch, has been procureable for fome time past by perfons of good credit, by way of difcount of commercial fecurities, is chiefly a temporary confequence of the preparation of money to be employed in the Government loan which was eagerly expected during the late winter and fpring. We all remember the disappointment of the money-lenders in November last, when Government borrowed only three millions out of fourteen that the loan was expected to confift of. Since that time, no doubt, there has been plenty of money for temporary occasions, but not to lend on mortgages or on perfonal fecurity, apart from trade. Thefe very opulent perfons, who boaft of fuch an abundance of money, will not invest any part of it in purchasing the land-tax, nor in loans to private perfons; except in difcounting bills or notes for the short period of fixty days, from which there refults a greater gain than five per cent. per annum,

PERMANENT LOANS, fuch as are adapted to the flow returns of agriculture, and cannot yield more than the legal rate of intereft,—thefe they utterly decline: and for an obvious reafon.— Land-owners have no means of giving more than five per cent. intereft,—except by the B deftructive deftructive means of granting annuities before taken notice of; but perfons in trade feel no difficulty in holding forth to bankers the temptation of more than the flatute-rate of interest upon loans of money, by means which *custom* warrants, and which the profits of trade are more than equivalent to.

No perfon who has been much accuftomed to transact loans on mortgages will deny the want of money, even its entire absence, in that channel of circulation; nor can any perfon who is moderately conversant with what passes in Westminster-Hall be uninformed of the diftrefs which this want of circulation occafions to those who, having formerly lent money on land, now want to have it returned, as well as to the unfortunate debtors, who cannot find perfons to affift them in paying off their debts by taking transfers of the exifting mortgages. It is well known to conveyancers that mortgage debts are most commonly discharged (even when money circulates freely) by transfers to other mortgagees, and not by actual payment on the part of the landowners, who are *feldum* capable of redeeming their lands : more frequently payment is made by felling the incumbered eftates.

SECT. II .- Danger of the Landed Interest.

WITHOUT fomething done to affift the LANDED INTEREST, the property in land will change hands almoft univerfally, or to a great extent, within a few years: lands will be brought to fale through the preffure of general diffrefs on the part of the landowners, and the price, which was for fome time kept up by peculiar caufes, will then fall very low.

It is beginning to fall already; and I have been well informed that an uncommon proportion *in value* of the eftates put up to fale by auction within the laft year and more, have been bought in for want of purchafers at a fair price.

Ir is high time that the land-owners fhould begin to look carefully to their own accommodation in refpect to the circulation of money; otherwife they muft be ruined. This is flating the cafe without exaggeration; for the merchants are getting vaft fortunes, whilft the land-owners are dwindling into comparative infignificance, and are in no fmall danger of becoming " hewers of " wood and drawers of water" to their rivals, the men of trade.

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I SHOULD not flate the matter in these strong terms, if I had not a full conviction that the landed interest, a very great part of it, is in imminent danger from the circumstances above set forth; and if I did not know that stating the case in a cold manner, destitute of energy, would utterly fail to produce any effect upon that class of society to which this part of the subject is peculiarly addressed.

For there are natural and permanent qualities in the character of the landed gentry of every country which caufe them to give a languid attention to their interefts as a body; the indolent and tranquil enjoyment of a revenue coming to them almost fpontaneoufly, without much thought or any labour, having naturally the effect of indifposing them to the confideration of danger at a diffance.

THEREFORE I cannot reafonably expect to be much liftened to by those who are most concerned in what I am now faying, unless some of their own order, or others whose judgment they are accustomed to respect, shall support me in warning them of their danger, and at the same time recommend the proposed means of relief; or until a nearer approach of the mischief, with some feeling of it, shall awaken their attention.

SECT.

SECT. III.—Correction of a wrong Supposition made by fome Perfons.

IT has been fuppofed by fome perfons that, because I have, in my former Letter, mentioned fifty millions or more as the fum which my fcheme might furnish for the purposes of circulation, it was my view to have fuch a large fum of money put into circulation whether the occafions of the country required it or not; and upon this miltaken supposition they have argued, that a proportionable increase of the prices of commodities would take place. But I have not proposed any thing like this, though I admit I might have excluded fuch a fuppolition in terms more guarded and lefs liable to be mifunderstood. I did not however speak quite incautiously; for, after mentioning fifty millions or more, I added, " if " fo much could be EMPLOYED :" and in a former paffage, I had proposed the scheme to be put in practice upon the ground and within the limits of necessity and utility, which I thought a fufficient intimation of the moderate use I wished to be made of the plan. But even if I had contemplated an immediate iffue of fuch a vaft quantity of paper money, it would not have raifed any fair objection to the principle of the measure; and indeed the whole

whole objection is only applicable to the abufe of the plan, and takes for granted that it is to be acted upon without regard to ordinary diference.

SECT. IV.—Prices of Commodities not inconveniently raifed by Paper-Money.

THERE are others who have contended, that an inconvenient increase of the prices of all commodities would take place, if *any* addition were made to the quantity of circulating-money. To this I answer as follows:

THE increase of money would not, I think, have the effect of *raising prices* in respect to the NECESSARIES of life, because the *quantities* of them (supposing the money judiciously applied by bringing more land into cultivation) would be *increased* in a greater proportion than the money; yet I do not deny that such articles of luxury or curiosity as cannot be increased in quantity by cultivation or manufacture, would advance in price: but I suppose this will not be much infisted upon.

FURTHER, this objection might with equal reason be urged against any other measure which should tend gradually to increase the money of the country;

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and yet fuch an increase has been at all times, and probably will always continue to be, an object of eager purfuit, notwithstanding the fupposed increase of prices confequent thereon.

IN fact, a moderate increase of prices is not an evil; for fuch an increase tends to the extension of agriculture and manufactures, and to flimulate industry in every possible way, and therefore is a great benefit to a country by augmenting the quantity of its commodities; and this, by its reaction, prevents the rife of prices from being too rapidly accelerated.

EVEN high prices are only difadvantageous when they are occafioned by a permanent, or an extreme fcarcity of commodities, or a very fudden fcarcity, that is, when the demand continues for a long time, or in a very uncommon degree, or fuddenly happens to exceed the fupply; and, in general, a period of high prices is foon followed by abundance, and fometimes by extraordinary cheapnefs; the high price operating as an incitement to produce new and greater quantities of the commodity which yields an unufual profit.

ADD to which, that the rife of prices is, in a great degree, an imaginary evil, fo far as adding to the flock of money may be fuppofed to occasion the increase increase of prices; for, in general, every man's share of money would be increased too. The price of labour would rife as well as other things; and this joint increase would cause new exertions of diligence, by inciting or obliging many perfons to work who are now idle, or to work with greater diligence than before.

I EXCEPT, however, the cafe of perfons who live on fixed incomes, which they are incapable of enlarging. To them, every increase of prices cannot but be a difadvantage. It is an unavoidable inconvenience, neceffarily attendant upon the ftationary position they hold. But it is not to be expected that the general progress of fociety is to be retarded, in order that these perfons may feel no manner of inconvenience from the circumftances which keep them in a ftate of inactivity, or hinder them from bettering their fortunes. The vigour of the nation cannot be kept down to the par of their imbecility; nor would this finally be any benefit to them, but very much the contrary : even if all neighbouring countries should, by univerfal agreement, confent to be stationary too,ceafing their progreffion in the arts and enjoyments of life. However, in the end, even perfons thus circumftanced would,-I mean many of them, -derive advantage from the operation of the plan,

by partaking, from collateral and accidental caufes, in the general profperity; and *all* of them would be eafed by the reduction of taxes, which would be one of the most probable and most extensive confequences of the proposed measure, as more fully noticed in a subsequent part of this Letter.

SECT. V.—The Advantages of the Plan, how to be disposed of.

IT has been faid, I understand, by fome perfons, that there is a *partiality* in giving to the stockholders the great advantages I have spoken of.

I HAVE faid the emoluments to refult from the plan ought to be divided between the Stock-Proprietors, the Bank of England, and the Government, (that is, the nation at large,) in fuch proportions as may be agreed upon; of courfe, in just and equitable proportions. Surely *fome* fhare of the advantages must be given to the ftock-transferrers, and fufficient to induce them to engage their property in the execution of the fcheme. This is all that I have in view, or have fuggested.

AND this may be done in the following manner: —Let the privilege of iffuing the proposed notes c be be given to the Subscribers to FUTURE GOVERN-MENT LOANS: and as the Subscribers, with this *bonus* given to them, would take the loans on better terms, in proportion to the advantages they obtained, *the whole Public* would by that means largely participate in the profit to refult from the fcheme.

SECT. VI.—How the Plan may be applied to the Relief of the Landed Interest.

My defign from the beginning was, and ftill is, to accomplifh, if I am able, the procuring of affiftance to those who want money upon the security of land to enable them to pay their debts, or to improve their estates; and even this not for their fakes only, but for the general good of the country.

IF the fcheme I have proposed should take a more extensive range, and become applicable to other purposes besides the relief of the landed interest, it will be an accidental result. I was looking for one thing, and it may turn out that I have found another of more importance; or rather an application of what I had in view to a more important subject. I believe this is what commonly happens in such cases.

BUT .

BUT (in relation to the landed intereft), I think the plan in queffion may be adapted to the accommodation of the LAND PROPRIETORS in the following manner:

LET the perfons who are to obtain the notes upon the fecurity of their transferred flock engage to lend the notes upon MORTGAGES of LAND, and to deposit the mortgages in the Bank of England within a limited time; their transferred flock being a fecurity for the performance of this engagement. And let the Mortgages, when deposited, be declared by the act of the Legislature, which is to establish the whole measure, a further and collateral fecurity for the amount of the circulating notes ;--each mortgage for the amount of the notes lent thereon. Thus the note-creditor, however well fatisfied he might be with the original fecurity of the flock, would have another fecurity of probably twice the amount of the notes,-a fecurity far fuperior to that of an undefined, and, in fome measure one may fay, an imaginary quantity of gold deposited in a Bank. Every million of notes would be reprefented by four millions of flock and about two millions sterling in land !- I do not, however, mean to reprefent this ADDITIONAL fecurity as NECESSARY to give ftrength to the original plan. I propofe it as fubordinate C 2

fubordinate and convenient merely, not at all as being effential.

THE mortgages when deposited would be capable of being transferred like other mortgages, but always subject to a general LIEN for the amount of the notes lent thereon; and might be discharged by bringing in to be cancelled an equal amount in notes of the same kind; these being cancelled, (that is, an equal amount, not the identical notes lent upon each mortgage,) the land might be reconveyed to the proper owner for the time being, discharged of the mortgage. And, at the same time, the transferred stock connected with the mortgage fo released, might be re-transferred to the person to whom it should then belong.

By this means there would be a conftant tendency of fome portion of the notes to return into the Bank to be cancelled; which would prevent an exceffive accumulation of the quantity; fome periods might alfo be fixed for this purpofe, and with this view; whereby the gradual and final extinction of the notes might be provided for, if a change of circumftances thould require fuch extinction,

THIS operation of lending upon mortgages should be left, I think, to the diference of the INDI- INDIVIDUALS by whom the loans are made, both in refpect to the titles to the mortgaged lands, and the quantity of fecurity, and, within fome limits to be preferibed, the periods of repayment alfo; except that fome fuperintendence would be proper merely to afcertain that the loans were made bonâ fide upon the lands appearing in the feveral mortgages, and not employed for any other purpofe in the first instance.—Of which the deposit of the mortgages, with proper inspection, would furnish good evidence.

THE rifk of the fecurity would upon this footing reft upon each individual lender; but that rifk, after the plan fhall have been acted upon for fome confiderable time, would be much lefs than it is now in fimilar loans; becaufe, as by the means propofed there would be established a very extensive register of mortgages, the disputes and frauds which too often attend fecurities of that nature would to a great degree be avoided.

THIS reftriction of the loans (fo long as it fhould be thought right to continue fuch reftriction) to landed fecurities would in itfelf limit the quantity of the proposed notes to the amount of the demand of money by land-owners defirous of borrowing. From them the money would be absorbed into the general general circulation, by payment of their debts, and by their making agricultural and other improvements.—By this means, alfo, tradefmen who are diffreffed for want of more early payment than they now receive, would be enabled to carry on their bufinefs and make their own payments with greater facility and more comfort than they can do at prefent.

SECT. VII.-General Advantages.

THUS, PUBLIC INDUSTRY would receive a new impulfe, employment would be given to many who are now in want of it, lands now unimproved and wafte would be brought into cultivation, houfes and other buildings would be repaired or erected, canals would be completed that are now left unfinished for want of money, bridges would be built, mines would be worked, NEW SOURCES of trade would be opened, and COMMERCE in a thousand ways would be invigorated and put into a flate of activity.

THIS may feem to fuppofe a more free use of the proposed money than could probably take place through loans on land only; but in whatever way, or to whatever extent, the money should be employed, the mass and quantity of useful and necessary commodities, commodities, and confequently the comforts of the people, would be increafed by this additional ftimulus given to the national exertion. This increafe would be proportionably greater than the increafe of money, fuppofing the latter to be added to with difcretion and by flow and gentle degrees, and not by an inundation of new reprefentativefigns; for it muft all along be borne in mind, that PUBLIC WISDOM is to direct the operation and to be employed in controlling the tides of this new money.

SECT. VIII.—Effect of the Plan upon the Rate of Interest, and Reduction of the National Debt.

ONE of the most direct confequences to be expected from my plan, is the lowering of the RATE OF INTEREST. If it should be reduced generally below five per cent. that reduction would take away a part of the gain originally computed in the plan. But this would be counterbalanced by the good effects which a low rate of interest always produces, and by other beneficial confequences which the plan may be made to accomplish.

INDEED, this lowering of the rate of intereft would be, above all other means, I conceive, the beft best auxiliary to the fund established by Parliament for relieving the nation from the pressure of its GREAT DEBT.

A MOST happy event it would be, if the five per cent. flock could be reduced to four, and the other flocks in like proportion. A reduction to that extent would be the fame thing in fubftance as a gratuitous extinction of a FIFTH PART of the NA-TIONAL DEBT; which confifts altegether, in refpect to the right of demanding payment, in the ANNUITY payable by the nation to its creditors. Nor would it be difficult to effect a reduction to this amount by the help of the plan in queffion; fuppofing the funds fhall ever again come to the prices they were at in 1792; a fuppofition which this plan would alfo tend to realize. I admit that this reduction can only accompany the fall of the market-rate of intereft.

THIS operation of diminishing the annual outgoing might begin precifely at the period when the SINKING FUND would lose part of its beneficial efficacy, in respect to buying up the public debt, on account of the near approach of 3 per cent. stock to par; in which stock purchases could then no longer be made with advantage, till the whole of the 5 per cent. and 4 per cent. stocks should be bought bought up. And though the latter flocks would be above par, the public would derive no gain from that circumflance, though the flock-holder might feem to fuftain a lofs by having his flock paid off at par. But the near profpect of fuch an event would keep those flocks from attaining the prices they would otherwise reach.

As, at the period I am now fpeaking of, the annual produce of the SINKING FUND could not, for the foregoing reafons, be applied with great advantage in buying up the national debt, I fubmit it might then be better difpofed of, as a PREMIUM, in conjunction with the PRIVILEGE of iffuing the notes in queftion, towards inducing monied men to lend large fums of money at a rate below the then current rate of intereft to be applied in paying off at par those debts which now carry a HIGH intereft. It will be foon found that I am not fpeaking without confideration when I talk of borrowing *below* the current rate of intereft, if that is not apparent already.

In this way, though the *nominal* amount of the debt might continue to be the fame as before, ftill the nation would be relieved by the reduction of the *annuity* in which the debt fubftantially confifts; and TAXES might then be repealed to a proportion-

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able amount, or the SINKING FUND might be enlarged, fuppoling the whole taxes to be fullained fome time longer: or, the *faving* might be applied in part to each of these objects.

To explain this proposed operation by an example :- Let us imagine an effate to be incumbered with a debt of £. 100,000, at 5 per cent. interest, or f. 5000 per annum. Then conceive the owner to be poffeffed of f. 10,000 in ready money, which if applied towards payment of the debt would reduce it to f. 90,000, and the annual intereft to f. 4500. But the owner, having regard as well to his own future convenience as to that of his family after him, is defirous that his eftate should be liable to a lefs annual outgoing; and therefore proposes to give the ten thousand pounds of which he is poffeffed, as a premium to induce fome perfon to pay off the debt on the eftate, and to accept a transfer of the fecurity at a lower rate than 5 per cent. And, in order further to abate the interest, he offers to give to the lender fome extremely valuable privileges of which he may be supposed to have the command. Add to this an expectation then formed, that the current rate of interest will speedily fall below 4 per cent. by the operation of fome known caufes.

UNDER these circumstances, we may suppose that the new lender would advance his money at a lower rate than 5, or even than 4 per cent.—Grant it might be 3 per cent.—And if this should be the case, the annual incumbrance on the estate will be reduced from \pounds . 5000 to \pounds . 3000.

I THINK the analogy is fo plain, that it is hardly neceffary to add that the £. 10,000 represents the produce of the Sinking Fund for a short period, suppose two or three years (more or lefs); and the privileges hinted at are correlative to the iffuing of notes to circulate as money on the credit of stock.—The rest is quite obvious.

SUPPOSING this to be underftood and affented to, I may now go on to fay, that if, at the period above alluded to, the produce of the INCOME TAX fhould be applied in the fame manner towards the reduction of the rate of intereft, the *effect* produced in that way would be greater, and the tax it/elf might properly be made to cease fooner, than by its application towards extinguishing the capital of the public debt.

AND in this respect, as well as in the general tendency of the plan to produce an abatement of

taxes,

taxes, perfons of fixed incomes would have the fatisfaction of feeing their own advantage connected with the public welfare; a circumftance which I have before alluded to, and which I have great pleafure in thus explaining and confirming: for I am anxious that my propofal floud produce nothing but GOOD; if that CAN be.

I ALLOW, that fo far as the produce of the Sinking Fund and that of the Income Tax are called in aid of this reduction of the annuity, the reduction would not be gratuitous; it is true:—but this does not hinder my first fuggestion on this point from being also true, namely, that the reduction in question might be brought about merely and folely by the help of this plan.—I believe it might, confidering the command over the rate of interest which it would give to those who hold the reins of government: a most important CONTROL in the bands of these who are to manage on the part of the DEBTOR !

YET it fill may be proper to make the Sinking Fund and Income Tax co-operate to the fame end; by which means a greater and more fpeedy effect will be produced towards leffening the national debt, than could be managed by the unaffifted operation of this plan.

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THERE certainly is not any thing that can fo effectually promote this reduction of the annual outgoing, as keeping the circulation of money conftantly full, and by that means lowering the rate of intereft; which hitherto there has not exifted the means of doing, but which by a right ufe of my plan may be accomplifhed : and this makes it be, what I humbly conceive it is,—a great political engine; in a word, A NEW POWER. I cannot refrain from faying fo mucb; for either it is THAF, or it is NOTHING.

SECT. 1X.—Bank of England.—How this Plan may be connected with it.

IT appears from the evidence before the SECRET COMMITTEE ON BANK AFFAIRS, that there were times within the ten years which preceded the Bank's ceafing to make payments in cafh, when the directors *deliberated* on reducing the rate of difcount: but they never did it; and though the reafons why they did not are left to be conjectured, it appears to me most clear that one of the principal caufes which hindered the establishment of that falutary regulation, was an uncertainty on the part of the Bank, whether they could constantly keep the circulation full, or whether they might venture to encourage (30)

encourage the abundant circulation which a low rate of interest would tend to promote.

How foon, under the prefent circumstances, the Bank may again think fit to leffen the amount of their *difcounts*, I do not pretend to conjecture; but fome confiderable effect in that way might probably be produced by a repeal of the prefent reftriction on the iffue of *cafb*.

I now come to fhew how my plan may be connected with the eftablifhment of the BANK of ENGLAND.

I SUBMIT that THAT BANK, though it has peculiar interefts of its own, may be moulded to purpofes of public utility within the limits of a juft and reafonable regard to those its interefts. It ought NOT to ftand in the way of the general good of the community.

THEREFORE, with due regard to the Bank interefts, I go on to fay that there ought to be a **PROPORTION** between the Bank capital and effects, and the amount of the notes circulated on the credit thereof.

I PRESUME to fuggest, that THAT PROPORTION should be publicly known and regulated by law. This This *publicity* would at all times protect the Bank against a *run* upon it, which can only proceed from panic fears and a distrust of its fecurity, occasioned by ignorance of its actual fituation.

THE amount of the circulating notes of the Bank, that is to fay, *circulating on the credit of the* Bank capital, ought never to exceed a fixed fum; let us fuppofe twelve millions.

ALL circulating bank paper beyond that amount ought to reft on other fecurity.

Now to apply these principles; let the Bank iffue its own notes instead of the notes I have called stock-notes. Let there be no distinction.

BUT let the Bank be *permanently protetted* by law against paying CASH beyond the amount of its own proper or restricted quantity of notes—*its* own debt—the twelve millions above mentioned.

Now suppose twenty millions to be in circulation, or any given fum exceeding twelve millions, the Bank might be liable (supposing the present restriction taken off) to be called upon for cash to the amount of twelve millions; — but the surplus sum they could not be required to pay in cash; cafh; therefore they could not fay their own eftablishment was endangered by the additional quantity of notes circulated on the credit of flock.

But if twenty millions were in circulation, the general call on the Bank for cafh may be fuppofed to be proportionably greater than if only twelve millions circulated; therefore the Bank muft keep a greater proportion of gold in their treafury to carry on its bufinefs; and for this, as well as for the management of the additional iffue of notes, the Bank fhould receive a compenfation, including a reafonable profit.—I fhall for the prefent reft the matter here fo far as concerns the Bank, conceiving that all its effential interefts are thus fully taken care of.

SECT. X.—The Security and Convenience to the Public under this Plan.

IN refpect to the PUBLIC, I cannot difcover any objection that they can make to the increafed circulation of bank notes upon the principles now laid down. They have been content with an almost total reftriction of the iffue of gold in payment of bank notes, and why should they not be equally well content with having a moderate proportion of those notes permanently exempted from being paid

paid in cash, there being other and most abundant fecurity for their amount ?- To fuppofe any inconvenience, one must make a previous supposition that all the notes of the Bank of England, circulating upon the credit of their own capital, are required to be paid in cash, with a settled purpose not to let it return there. But this supposes the natural death of the Bank; a perpetual ceffation of its use as a bank : a most chimerical supposition ! But even granting this infinitely improbable event to take place, still the furplus quantity of notes would be reprefented by a fourfold quantity of flock and a double value in land, and these remaining notes would then be more convenient and neceffary than ever: for the Bank of England notes, its own. proper and restricted quantity, being supposed extinguished, the furplus notes would be effentially neceffary to the purposes of COMMERCE, if any were fupposed to remain.

THESE NOTES WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE; and by fuitable provisions to be made by the Legislature at that time, might be liquidated in gold and filver as occasion might require. To fuppose the contrary, is to suppose trade annihilated and all occasions for remittances from place to place within Great Britain to be put an end to for ever. So that it is only by imagining feveral events to take place, each

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of them involving very high degrees of improbability, that the circulation of the proposed notes once begun can be expected ever to ceafe.

THE fuppolition of the extinction of that quantity of notes which is peculiarly to belong to the Bank of England, I need hardly fay is made by way of argument, and not with any expectation of its ever being realized. But the very putting of fuch a cafe, even in this way, may appear alarming to therefore, I might propose that the fome ; whole profits to refult from the new quantity or notes should be, annually or half yearly, fubjected in the first place to indemnify the Bank of England against fuch loss or detriment as this fcheme may bring upon them; that indemnity being made good out of the dividends of the transferred stock. I believe such a guarantee (under circumstances fo very improbable) from the new fystem to the old one, would not deprive the former, the new fystem, of any part of its efficacy, or caufe the flock-proprietors to abate their expectations of gain from the operation of the scheme. The effect of such arrangement would be, that the Bank of England would have constantly a profit upon twelve millions, or whatever might be the reftricted or the actual amount of their circulation, not exceeding twelve millions; and the ftock transferrers would have the profit upon whatever

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whatever might at any time be the additional quantity; subject, in respect to the latter, to a proper deduction out of the dividends of the transferred flock for the charges of management and otherwife in favour of the Bank .-- I believe this will appear eafily intelligible to those who will take the trouble of thinking a little upon the point : but I am fenfible this part of the cafe requires rather more attention than the reft .- It is, however, of the least consequence, as it applies only to the most improbable of all the fuppofitions which the cafe requires to be made: and if it creates a difficulty in the mind of any reader, it may be paffed over, without any difadvantage to the right comprehenfion of the scheme: for it is only an answer to a very refined and even imaginary objection.

SECT. XI. - Conclusion.

But, the original queftion recurs:—Is there a want of circulating-money? And alfo the other queftion, —WILL the Public receive and circulate thefe notes as cafh?—Concerning both of which queftions, if I expressed naturally and without referve all that I think and feel, I should manifest such a degree of confidence of having made good what I have had in

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view,

view, as would fcarcely feem confiftent with that deference with which I mean, Sir, to fubmit the whole matter to your fuperior difcernment; as I must ultimately do to the JUDGMENT of the Public.

For the fake of brevity, and for other reafons, I have omitted fome things that might be faid in confirmation of my politions, and perhaps even fome explanations that may be thought neceffary by those who are fond of minute flatements; but I think it best to leave the matter here.—Permit me, therefore, to conclude with what I cannot but think very honourable to myself—I mean, a declaration of the fincere and respectful attachment with which I am bound ever to be,

SIR, Your devoted and faithful fervant, &c. &c. &c.

LONDON, 18th June 1799.

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A SMALL number of Copies of this Second Letter having been distributed, I have the fatisfaction to find it is allowed, by perfons in whofe judgment I have great reason to confide, that the SCHEME is PRACTICABLE, and may prove useful in its present shape .- But I neither expect nor defire its adoption till the neceffity of it shall be generally acknowledged .- Perhaps the univerfal admission of this neceffity is very near at hand; for at this moment an uncommonly great Scarcity of Money (fuch as was predicted in page 8. of this Letter) is felt in TRADE, as well as by the LANDED INTEREST; and this Scarcity, if permitted to continue and increafe, (which it will do, unlefs checked by timely precautions,) will be productive of extremely diftreffing CONSEQUENCES.

THERE were inferted, in the diftributed Copies of this Letter, fome particular *objections* which had been made to the propofal, as flated in the first Letter, together with answers thereto. Those objections are now omitted, the latter part of the Letter which contained them having been re-printed for for that purpole.—This was done in compliance with a wifh from the quarter from which the objections were communicated to me.

I HAVE not heard of any other objections which, in my opinion, (judging with as perfect an indifference as I am able to do in my own cafe,) apply fairly and correctly to the plan; fuppofing the Explanations and Modifications contained in this Second Letter to be duly confidered.

24th Sept. 1799.

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(38)







